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I. INTRODUCTION
URING the survey period, Texas appellate courts and a federal
district court heard several cases involving Texas environmental
issues.1 Two of the most significant cases provide interpretations
of law that may have a substantial impact on the management of hazard-
ous waste and the powers of the State to require remediation in Texas. In
Ex parte Elliott,2 the court ruled that in order to avoid constitutional inva-
lidity for improper delegation of lawmaking power to a federal agency,
those wastes that are considered hazardous under the Texas Solid Waste
Disposal Act are those the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency listed
or classified as hazardous waste as of July 30, 1991, not those listed or
classified as hazardous waste by the EPA thereafter. 3 Under this holding,
the State's power to regulate wastes as hazardous wastes may not be as
extensive as previously thought. In Hicks v. Humble Oil and Refining
1. Several environmentally-related cases decided in Texas over the past year were not
designated for publication, and thus are not reviewed at length in this article. These cases
included: Evans v. Consolidated Services, Inc., 1998 WL 429619 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] July 30, 1998, no pet. h.) (concluding that, despite earnest-money contract's "as
is" provision, prospective purchaser's conduct in refusing to close due to possible environ-
mental problems with the land constituted a repudiation of the contract); Coastal Incinera-
tion Corporation v. Rodgers, 1998 WL 426038 (Tex. App.-Austin July 30, 1998, no pet. h.)(holding that a tenant's taking on the responsibility to curtail and clean up pollution was
valid consideration for the purposes of the lease); Maxus Energy Corporation v. Occiden-
tal Chemical Corp., 1998 WL 269994 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 28, 1998, pet. denied) (con-
sidering whether future costs could be within the jurisdiction of a court interpreting an
environmental-cost-sharing provision of a stock-purchase agreement).
2. 973 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet. h.).
3. See id. at 742.
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Co.,4 the court concluded that the Texas Water Pollution Control Act of
1961, the Texas Water Quality Act of 1957, Chapter 26 of the Texas Water
Code, the Texas Clean Air Act of 1987, and the Sanitation and Health
Act of former article 4477-1 of 1987 do not apply retroactively to activi-
ties occurring prior to the enactment of the statutes.5 To the extent this
holding is adopted statewide, and to the extent it may be extended to
include the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act, it could reduce the power of
the State to take enforcement action or to require remediation of envi-
ronmental contamination caused by activities occurring many years ago.
Two other significant cases involved environmental-tort claims. These
two cases provide standards for evaluating a statute-of-limitations de-
fense and the ability to challenge the causation element of plaintiffs'
claims. Under the recent Texas Supreme Court pronouncements in the
Robinson6 and Havner7 cases, courts must take a hard look at the expert
opinions offered to prove causation in environmental-tort suits. Another
significant decision limited the ability of current landowners to sue prior
landowners, particularly under nuisance and strict liability claims.8
An important case in the Survey period addressed the constitutional
limits of government to prohibit the use of property for oil and gas drill-
ing in order to protect the environment.9 Another decision addressed the
standing of citizens to challenge environmental permits being considered
by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation.10 A federal court decided a
potentially significant case for interpreting indemnities covering environ-
mental liabilities." Finally, another court upheld a jury finding that im-
posed liability on corporate shareholders for the costs incurred by the
Railroad Commission of Texas for plugging and abandoning wells where
the shareholders were accused of siphoning off the assets of the corpora-
tion to avoid this obligation, and to avoid reimbursing the State for com-
pleting the obligation. 12
4. 970 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Houston [14'h Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
5. See id.
6. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
7. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1996).
8. See Hicks v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 970 S.W.2d (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
9. See Trail Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 954 S.W.2d 625 (Tex App.-Hous-
ton 114th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
10. See Heat Energy Advanced Tech., Inc. v. West Dallas Coalition for Envtl. Justice,
962 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
11. Fina, Inc. v. Arco, 16 F. Supp 716 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
12. See Love v. State, 972 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
[Vol. 521108
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
A. THE TEXAS SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION'S SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE
BY IMPROPERLY DELEGATING GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY
TO A FEDERAL AGENCY BECAUSE THE COURT FOUND THAT
HAZARDOUS WASTES ARE THOSE LISTED OR CLASSIFIED
BY EPA AS OF JULY 30, 1991
In an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus from a criminal
defendant, the Austin Court of Appeals in Ex parte Elliott 3 considered
the defendant's contention that provisions of state statutes defining haz-
ardous wastes as those identified or listed by the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency are invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of authority
from the state legislature to a federal agency.
The defendant in Elliott was indicted for transporting hazardous waste
to an unpermitted location and for illegal storage of hazardous waste. 14
The criminal statute defined "hazardous waste" as "'solid waste identified
or listed as a hazardous waste by the administrator of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency under the federal Solid Waste Dispo-
sal Act, as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, as amended (42 U.S.C. Section 6901, et seq.). ' '"15 Elliott contended
that this provision constituted a delegation of power, by the Texas legisla-
ture to the federal government, to define hazardous waste under Texas
law and that such delegation "constitutes a surrender of [Texas'] legisla-
tive power to the federal government. 1 6 Since the term "hazardous
waste" was, at least in the defendant's words, an "essential element" of
the prohibited conduct of which he was accused, the defendant claimed
that relief from the criminal indictment should be granted. 17
In analyzing this question, the Austin Court of Appeals reviewed Texas
precedent concerning legislative delegation. The court acknowledged
that according to factors for considering the constitutionality of a "public
delegation," the nature of the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act's hazard-
ous waste provision could have, without more, placed in doubt the consti-
tutionality of the provision.18 The court stated that the Texas hazardous
waste definition "may be read to say that the legislature has delegated to
the EPA the power to define hazardous waste under the [Texas Health
and Safety Code] and that definition may change from time to time at the
will of the EPA without intervention by, or guidance from, the [Texas]
13. 973 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet. h.).
14. See id. at 738.
15. Id. at 739 (quoting Former TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.003(15)
(Vernon 1992), amended by TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.003(12) (Vernon
Supp. 1998)).
16. Id.
17. See id. at 738-39.
18. See id. at 741 (quoting Housing Auth. of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 143




The court recognized, however, that the Texas Supreme Court has ap-
proved statutes that refer to other statutes and therefore make them ap-
plicable to the new statute. The catch, for purposes of validity under the
"rule of incorporation by reference," is that "'when a statute is adopted
by a specific descriptive reference, the adoption takes the statute as it
exists at that time, and the subsequent amendment thereof would not be
within the terms of the adopting act.' 20 Therefore, the court in Elliott
held that the Texas statute impliedly referred to the federal definition of
hazardous waste as it existed as of the date the Texas statute was enacted,
July 30, 1991.21 The court concluded that this reference fixed in time sur-
vived constitutional challenge because the incorporation by reference of
existing federal laws and regulations promulgated thereunder by federal
agencies does not incorporate future amendments by Congress to statutes
or changes to federal agency regulations. The court also determined that
in defining hazardous waste under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act,
the legislature does not need to provide limitations on the EPA's power
to promulgate new regulations in the future because the discretion of the
EPA is fixed in the form of regulations existing at a particular time.22
The court in essence held that the definition of "hazardous waste" is
fixed in time under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act. But this ques-
tions the understanding of the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission (TNRCC), the regulated community in Texas, and the
EPA-the latter having delegated authority under the federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act to Texas to administer the federal haz-
ardous waste laws. The assumption by relevant parties is that the
TNRCC may amend its regulations to include newly listed or classified
hazardous waste. Elliott suggests that the State and the TNRCC specifi-
cally do not have the power to regulate under the hazardous waste pro-
gram wastes listed or classified by the EPA as hazardous wastes after July
30, 1991. This could have a very significant impact on how the TNRCC
regulates wastes and how the regulated community addresses waste man-
agement activities.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF CITY ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
THE DRILLING OF OIL AND GAS WELLS IN CITY'S
WATERSHED HELD TO BE BARRED BY TEN-YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND TO BE
VALID EXERCISE OF CITY's POLICE POWER
The degree to which a governmental restriction on the use of property
requires compensation under an inverse condemnation theory and
whether it violates constitutional protections has long been a controver-
19. Id.
20. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Trimmier v. Carlton, 296 S.W. 1070, 1074 (1927)).
21. See id.
22. See id. at 742.
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sial issue. Courts in recent years have typically become more concerned
with protecting private property interests. But the Fourteenth District
Court of Appeals in Houston upheld a City of Houston ordinance that
prohibited the drilling of oil and gas wells within the watershed of Lake
Houston.23
In 1967, the City of Houston amended a prior ordinance that provided
that no drilling of oil and gas wells shall take place closer than 1000 feet
from Lake Houston or any of its drains, streams, or tributaries, or at an
elevation of less than forty-eight feet above mean sea level.24 This ordi-
nance had no provision to allow a variance.
A parent company of the plaintiff acquired the leasehold interests in
1972. The plaintiff was assigned the mineral leases within the restricted
area in 1986. In 1994, Trail Enterprises sought a variance from the ordi-
nance, to which the City did not respond. The plaintiff filed suit in 1995.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court denied
plaintiff's motion and granted summary judgment to the City based upon
the conclusion that the ten-year statute of limitations had expired. 25
The plaintiff asserted that its property had been taken without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion and the takings clause of the Texas Constitution. Courts have long
recognized the claim of inverse condemnation. 26 The court identified
several ways that inverse condemnation can occur: physical invasion of
property; appropriation of property; unreasonable interference with the
landowner's right to use and enjoy the property, such as by restricting
access to the property or denying a permit for development. 27 It was the
last means by which a taking may occur that was before the court. In this
regard the court stated that "[g]overnmental restrictions on the use of
property can be so burdensome that they result in a compensable
taking. 28
The court recognized, however, the countervailing ability of govern-
ment to exercise its police power, particularly where necessary to protect
the health, safety, and general welfare of its people.29 After citing the
seminal case on the issue, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,30 the court
concluded that property values to some extent exist under an "'implied
23. See Trail Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 957 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [141h Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
24. See id. at 628.
25. See id. at 629.
26. See id. at 630 (citing City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978); City of
Abilene v. Burk Royalty Co., 470 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1971)).
27. See id. (citing Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995); Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. 1992)).
28. Id. (quoting San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266, 273 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
29. See id. (citing City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 804,
805 (Tex. 1984); Woodson Lumber Co. v. City of College Station, 752 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ)).
30. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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limitation"' based on the exercise of the government's police power. 31
The court's analysis then turned to the question of whether the plaintiff
had timely filed its claim against the city. The court ruled that the ten-
year statute of limitations applies to claims for inverse condemnation.
32
The court rejected the mineral interest owner's argument that the taking
did not occur when the ordinance was passed, which occurred more than
ten years before suit was filed, but when the City denied a variance from
that regulation, which occurred less than ten years before suit was filed.
33
The plaintiff then argued that the city must prove the elements of ad-
verse possession to prevail in its claim that the ten-year limitations period
applied. The court rejected this argument. The court apparently ruled
that an inverse taking is analogous to adverse possession, but that it was
not in fact adverse possession.34 Thus, while the same limitations period
applied, the city did not have to prove the same elements.
The plaintiff asserted an alternative argument that the City was es-
topped from asserting its limitations defense. The basis for this argument
was that the City had sold the mineral interests to the current or former
landowner. The city allegedly had agreed to allow development of min-
eral interests by contract and in the mineral rights set out in the city deed.
The plaintiff asserted that the ordinance impaired the plaintiff's contrac-
tual rights in violation of the federal and state constitutions.
The court ruled first that estoppel generally does not apply to a gov-
erning body exercising governmental functions. 35 Without an estoppel
argument, the plaintiff could only rely upon the constitutional challenge
of violation of contractual rights.
The court proceeded to address the question of violation of contractual
rights. The court ruled that the Texas Constitution allowed laws to impair
contractual rights where necessary to protect public safety and welfare.
36
Moreover, the court analyzed the contract with the city. The court con-
31. See id. at 630-31 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
32. See id. at 631 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.026 (Vernon 1986);
Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 100 (1961) (holding that ten-year
limitations period applied while rejecting the claim that two-year limitations barred action
for a taking that occurred when operation of dam and formation of lake cased flooding of
sewage disposal plant); Waddy v. City of Houston, 834 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (affirming summary judgment where city established that
sewer pipe's installation seventy years before suit was filed was significantly more than ten-
year limitations period for inverse condemnation); Hudson v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.,
626 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reversing a summary
judgment where the trial court failed to apply ten-year limitations period to inverse con-
demnation claim); Hubler v. City of Corpus City, 564 S.W.2d 816, 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (distinguishing ten-year limitations period for "tak-
ing" from two-year period for "damaging" property)).
33. See Trail Enterprises, Inc., 957 S.W.2d at 631.
34. See id. at 632.
35. See id. at 633 (citing Bowman v. Lumberton I.S.D., 801 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex.
1990); Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. G.T.E. Directories Corp., 905 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied); Farmer's Marine Copper Works, Inc. v. City of Galveston,
757 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ)).
36. See id. (citing Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. State, 711 S.W.2d 421, 424-25 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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cluded that the contract permitted drilling "only if there was no pollution
of the lake."' 37 The record contained evidence that the ordinance was
passed after wells drilled in the area had caused pollution of the lake.
Thus, the court ruled that the arguments made by the plaintiff did not
prohibit the City's assertion of the statute of limitations.38
The Plaintiff also challenged the City ordinance on three other consti-
tutional grounds. First, the plaintiff asserted that the passage of the ordi-
nance involved improper notice, and therefore denied plaintiff due
process as required by article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution and
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The
court rejected this claim. 39 The court concluded that the plaintiff did not
own the mineral interests when the ordinance was passed rendering the
method of passing the ordinance immaterial. 40 When the parent com-
pany of the plaintiff originally purchased the mineral interests it was
charged with notice of the ordinance.41 The court also ruled that persons
are "charged with constructive notice of the actual knowledge that could
have been acquired by examining public records" and that those residing
in a city or doing business with a city are presumed to have knowledge of
the city's ordinances. 42
The second constitutional challenge involved equal protection. The
plaintiff contended that a small group of mineral interest owners within
the city's extra-territorial jurisdiction were required to pay the cost of
protecting the City's water supply, while mineral interest owners in the
City limits are free to drill within the protected zone by the lake and
drainage to the lake. The City contended that the ordinance applies
equally to mineral interest owners in the extra-territorial jurisdiction of
the City. The court concluded that the summary judgment does not con-
tain any evidence of other drilling activity with the area of Lake
Houston.43
The plaintiff further asserted that the ordinance violated substantive
due process. Substantive due process required the ordinance to have a
reasonable relation to a legitimate state purpose and to not be arbitrary
or discriminatory. To pass equal protection muster, the classification
must also be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. In reviewing
city ordinances, the court ruled that to be revised by a court, the city
ordinance must be arbitrary, unreasonable, or a clear abuse of power.
The burden for the party challenging a city ordinance on constitutional
37. Id.
38. See id. at 634.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. (citing City of Dallas V. Coffin, 245 S.W.2d 203, 206-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
42. See id. (citing Mooney v. Hartin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981); Board of Adjust-
ment of the City of San Antonio v. Nelson, 577 S.W. 783, 786 (Tex. App.-San Antonio),




grounds is extraordinary and the constitutionality of the ordinance is
presumed.
In reviewing this issue, the court cited cases holding that the right to
drill for oil and gas is subject to "reasonable restriction by the state. '44
The court concluded that the ordinance was "reasonably related" to the
City's need to protect its water supply.45 Accordingly, the court ruled the
ordinance did not violate substantive due process or equal protection
provisions of the state and federal constitutions.46
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the ordinance vio-
lated the constitution because it was retroactive in effect.47 The court
ruled that this restriction must be balanced against a government's inter-
est in exercising its police power, and that the City's interest in protecting
its water supply from pollution outweighed any retroactive concern.48
C. THE CRIMINAL PROVISION OF THE TEXAS SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL
ACT PROHIBITING THE DUMPING OF SOLID WASTE IN AN
UNAUTHORIZED LOCATION Is NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
In Acosta v. State,49 the defendant, who was convicted of a misde-
meanor offense of illegal dumping under the Texas Health and Safety
Code, contended that the statutory definition of "solid waste" in that stat-
ute was unconstitutionally vague as it applied to his actions.50 The de-
fendant had used his pickup truck to transport dirt from a home
construction site and had dumped that dirt at another construction site
where other piles of dirt were located. 51
The court noted that the relevant provision of the Texas Health and
Safety Code forbids the knowing and intentional disposal of "'litter or
other solid waste at a place that is not an approved solid waste
site .... "',52 However, the statutory definition of the term "solid waste"
excepts "'soil, dirt, rock, sand and other natural or man-made inert solid
materials used to fill land if the object of the fill is to make the land
suitable for the construction of surface improvements.' ' '53 Because the
phrase "used to fill land" is undefined and, at least according to the de-
fendant in Acosta, "susceptible to varying interpretations," this exception,
44. Id. at 635 (citing Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tex. 1948); R.D.




47. See id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 16).
48. See id.
49. 972 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet. h.).
50. See id. at 98.
51. See id.
52. Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 365.012(a) (Vernon 1992 &
Supp. 1998)).




it was argued, rendered the definition of solid waste unconstitutionally
vague.54
The Acosta court recited the following test to determine whether the
definition was unconstitutionally vague:
First, we must determine whether the law gives a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so
that he may act accordingly. Second, we must determine if the law
provides adequate standards to those who enforce it so that it cannot
be arbitrarily and discriminatorily applied.55
The court concluded that based upon the record, Acosta and his son
did not place the dirt and rock at the site to "make the land suitable for
the construction of surface improvements. ' 5 6 The court also noted no
evidence was found in the record that the dirt already present at the con-
struction site was placed there for construction of surface improve-
ments.5 7 The court finally determined that, according to Acosta's own
admissions, the dirt was merely left near other dirt.58 Considering the
specific conduct in which the defendant was engaged, the court found
that no "person of ordinary intelligence would mistake the specific statu-
tory exception for fill dirt as an open invitation to dump dirt and rock at
any convenient construction site."'59
What is missing in the Acosta decision is a discussion of the application
of the second prong of the vagueness test which the court itself articu-
lated. While the court may have been justifiably concerned about the
possibility of bands of roaming trucks looking to dump their loads "at any
convenient construction site, ' 60 the decision gives little guidance on how
a person who in fact has no intention of breaking the law must ascertain
whether the fill-dirt exception to the solid waste rules applies in a given
situation. For example, what advice should a practitioner give to a client
(say, a construction contractor) who may routinely handle truckloads of
debris ultimately utilized for construction fill? The Acosta decision gives
little guidance to help that client develop procedures to ensure that he or
she is at all times operating within the terms of the construction fill excep-
tion. Given the increase in criminal prosecutions in the environmental
arena, concerns may perhaps be justifiably raised about the solid waste
disposal laws being "arbitrarily and discriminatorily applied. '61
54. Id.
55. Id. at 97-98 (citing Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 773) (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).





61. See Bynum, 767 S.W.2d 769 at 773.
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III. STANDING TO BRING CLAIMS UNDER
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
A. A LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP HAS STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE RENEWAL OF A PERMIT FOR A
HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY
The concept of "standing" in the context of litigation by environmental
groups has long been a source of controversy. 62 A Texas court again en-
tered the fray in 1998 in Heat Energy Advanced Technology, Inc. v. West
Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice.63 In overturning a decision by
the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC)
whereby the TNRCC determined that a local environmental group did
not have standing to challenge a hazardous waste facility's application for
a renewal permit, the Austin Court of Appeals in Heat Energy considered
issues concerning (1) the process of obtaining judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions, and (2) how a review by an agency of the decisions of an
administrative law judge should be judged by the courts.
The controversy from which the Heat Energy case arose began when
Heat Energy Advanced Technology (HEAT), a hazardous and industrial
waste storage and processing facility in Dallas, applied to the TNRCC to
renew its permit.64 A group of individuals who lived near the HEAT
facility, calling themselves the West Dallas Coalition for Environmental
Justice (the Coalition), requested that the TNRCC conduct a hearing on
the permit renewal.65 An administrative law judge concluded that the
Coalition had standing to participate in the hearing; however, the
TNRCC disagreed, substituting its own findings of fact and conclusions of
law.66 The Coalition filed a motion for rehearing but, before the TNRCC
had ruled on that motion, also filed a petition for judicial review by the
district court.67 The district court determined that the TNRCC had ex-
ceeded its authority in overturning the decision of the administrative law
judge. 68
1. Procedural Issues
The appeals court first had to consider whether the district court had in
fact been divested of jurisdiction because the Coalition filed its petition
for judicial review before the TNRCC had acted upon the Coalition's
motion for rehearing.69 As a general rule in Texas, an individual fails to
invoke jurisdiction if a petition for such review is filed before receiving a
62. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (considering whether an envi-
ronmental group had standing to challenge development of a wilderness area).
63. 962 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
64. See id. at 289.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 289-90.
67. See id. at 290.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 290-93.
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ruling on a motion for administrative rehearing.70 The court also recog-
nized, however, an exception to this general rule.71 As the court noted in
Simmons, the statute under which the controversy arose required that a
petition for judicial review be filed "within 30 days of the date the agency
sent him notice of the order. '72 Since the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) allowed an agency at least forty-five days to rule on the motion for
rehearing,73 the petitioner in Simmons was caught in a "catch-22. '74
Thus, the petitioner in Simmons properly invoked jurisdiction even
though he filed the petition for judicial review while the motion for re-
hearing was still pending with the agency. 75
Because the Texas Water Code required the Coalition to file its peti-
tion for judicial review "within 30 days after the effective date of the rul-
ing, order, or decision," the Heat Energy court considered whether the
so-called "Simmons exception" applied. 76 Key to this analysis, was when
the agency order denying the Coalition standing became "effective." The
court noted that agencies "have the discretion to set effective dates for
their decisions and orders" and "[t]he legislative rather than the judicial
branch is the appropriate authority to establish limits on agency discre-
tion to set effective dates. ''77 Since nothing in the record indicated that
the TNRCC had manifested any particular intent with respect to when
the order became effective, the court looked to the APA which, according
to the court, "suggests the order might have become 'effective' when the
Coalition received actual notice of it.''78 "[I]t was entirely reasonable for
the Coalition to conclude that the order might become effective before
the date it became final and appealable;" therefore, the Coalition had
properly invoked jurisdiction even though its petition was "premature. '79
2. Standing Requirements
Having determined that the district court had jurisdiction, the next step
was analyze the TNRCC's reversal of the administrative law judge's opin-
ion.80 The court declined to decide which standard of review applied to
the district court in making such an analysis since, in the appellate court's
opinion, the commission's action was not supported even when applying
the relatively deferential "substantial evidence" standard (which HEAT
had argued was applicable). 81 Under the substantial evidence standard, a
70. See id. at 290 (citing Lindsay v. Sterling, 690 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex. 1985)).
71. See id. at 291 (citing Simmons v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 925 S.W.2d
652 (Tex. 1996)).
72. Id. at 291 (citing Simmons, 925 S.W.2d at 653).
73. See id.
74. Id. (citing Simmons, 925 S.W.2d at 653-54).
75. See id.
76. Id. at 291-92 (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.351(b)).
77. Id. at 292.
78. Id. at 293.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 293-95.
81. See id. at 294-95.
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court reviews an agency's legal conclusions for error of law, and reviews
the agency's factual findings for support by substantial evidence. 82 The
court concluded that the TNRCC "could not have reasonably determined
the Coalition did not have standing": 83
Mr. Jose Acosta, a member of the Coalition, testified through an in-
terpreter before the [administrative law judge] that his home was
about one and one-half blocks from the HEAT facility. He said he
detected odor coming from the direction of the HEAT facility, and
that the odor was especially strong in the afternoons. He testified it
affected his breathing, and that he had sought medical attention for
throat problems caused by the odors. HEAT attempted to discredit
Mr. Acosta's testimony by pointing out that the plant was south of
his house, and that at one point Mr. Acosta said the odors were com-
ing from the west. HEAT also suggested that other businesses in the
area used chemicals and intimated that those facilities might have
created the odors Mr. Acosta smelled. HEAT admitted, however,
that it was planning to reduce its odor emissions in conjunction with
the resolution of a separate [TNRCC] enforcement proceeding. This
evidence suggests the HEAT facility had the potential to emit odors,
and it lends credence to Mr. Acosta's assertion that he smelled odors
coming from the HEAT facility.84
Since the proper standard to determine standing "does not require par-
ties to show they will ultimately prevail in their lawsuits," merely that
they "show only that they will potentially suffer harm or have a 'justicia-
ble interest' related to the proceedings," the findings that the TNRCC
substituted for the administrative law judge's, given the above recitation
of the facts as the court saw them, were not supported by substantial
evidence.85
While the Heat Energy case has been noted by others as potentially
significant, 86 its precedential value may have been somewhat limited by a
subsequent change in the TNRCC's administrative procedure. Decisions
regarding standing will now be typically made before the commission it-
self rather than first before an administrative law judge.8 7 Thus, the stan-
dards enunciated in Heat Energy regarding agency review of
administrative law judge decisions may not in fact come into play in many
instances. Nevertheless, if the holding of this case were interpreted as
liberalizing standing requirements before the TNRCC itself, an increased
82. See id. (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174; Southwestern Public Serv. Co.
v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., 962 S.W.2d 207, 214-216 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet.
denied); Lauderdale v. Texas Dep't of Agric., 923 S.W.2d 834, 836-37 (Tex. App.-Austin
1996, no writ)).
83. Id. at 295.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.115(a); Texas Rivers Protection Ass'n v.
Texas National Resource Conservation Comm'n, 910 S.W.2d 147, 151, 152 n.2 (Tex.
App.-Austin, 1995, writ denied)).
86. See, e.g., Note, Heat Energy Advanced Tech., Inc. v. West Dallas Coalition for
Envtl. Justice, 28 ST. B. TEX. ENvmL. L.J. 183 (1998).
87. See 30 T.A.C. § 55.27(a) (1998).
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number of commission hearings regarding similar matters could be ex-
pected in the future.
IV. COMMON LAW ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS
A. A Two-HUNDRED-MILLION-DOLLAR JUDGMENT WAS REVERSED
AND RENDERED BASED UPON EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS AND THE LACK OF CAUSATION EVIDENCE
PROVIDED BY PLAINTIFFS' EXPERTS
In what is perhaps one of the most significant and well-publicized opin-
ions regarding environmental torts, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals re-
versed and rendered a $200,000,000 judgment that the trial court awarded
to a group of plaintiffs in Wise County, Texas. In Mitchell Energy Corpo-
ration v. Bartlett,88 the court ruled that the jury and judge had erred in not
finding that all but a few of the numerous plaintiffs had failed to bring
their causes of action within the applicable statute of limitations periods.
The court further held that all of the plaintiffs had failed to provide suffi-
cient causation evidence to prevail on their claims.8 9
The relevant factual background is that Mitchell Energy Corporation
(Mitchell Energy) drilled numerous gas wells beginning in the 1950s in an
area of Wise County. At the time of the trial, Mitchell Energy had about
2,000 operating wells in the area. The producing zone lies some 5,000 to
7,000 feet below the surface and the groundwater acquifer was found at
200 to 400 feet below the ground. The plaintiffs were numerous individu-
als who lived in Wise County and whose groundwater wells were drilled
into the Twin Mountain aquifer, which was part of the Trinity Aquifer.
These plaintiffs purchased their land at various times from about 1977 to
1993. The majority of the plaintiffs knew that their wells were not useful
for drinking water purposes because of a bad odor they detected at the
time, or shortly after, they purchased their property. According to the
appellate court's opinion, all but a few of the plaintiffs knew of the ad-
verse conditions affecting their wells more than two years before they
filed suit against Mitchell Energy.
As in most environmental tort suits, the plaintiffs filed claims of nui-
sance, negligence, trespass, violation of Texas Railroad Commission
Rules, and fraud. They also sought punitive damages based upon allega-
tions of gross negligence, fraud, and malice. After trial, the jury awarded
actual damages and punitive damages in the amount of $200,000,000.90
The trial court rendered judgment based upon the jury's verdict.91 Need-
less to say, the appeal was of significant import to those practicing in the
environmental tort area because of the amount of the award and because
of the legal issues that were before the Fort Worth Court of Appeals.
88. 958 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1997, pet. denied).
89. See id. at 447.




1. Statutes of Limitations
a. Knowledge of the Injury Alone, Rather than Knowledge of Both
Injury and the Cause of the Injury, Is Sufficient to Begin
the Running of Limitations
A critical issue in many environmental tort suits is whether the plain-
tiffs filed their claims within the relevant statute of limitations period. In
many cases, the alleged harm, such as soil or groundwater contamination,
has been present for years or decades. In these cases, Defendants usually
attack plaintiffs claims through motions for summary judgment and, if not
successful, at trial argue that the plaintiffs claims are barred on limitations
grounds. Plaintiffs usually assert many rebuttals to the limitations chal-
lenge, including fraudulent concealment and continuing-tort theories. In
Mitchell Energy, the issue was decided by a jury and not overruled by the
trial court. 92 Thus, on appeal, one of the main issues out of thirty-one
points of error was the question of whether the jury instruction was
proper as to statute of limitations.93
The key issue decided by the court of appeals was the question of the
applicability of what is known as the "discovery rule" under the law gov-
erning statutes of limitation. The first issue was whether plaintiffs were
seeking damages for permanent or temporary injury to real property.94
The second issue was whether the plaintiffs knew or reasonably should
have known of the injury in order for the cause of action to accrue and
the statute of limitations to begin to run.95 In environmental and toxic
tort cases, the question is often whether the plaintiff must know only of
the injury, or both the injury and the cause of the injury before the cause
of action accrues.
The jury instruction in Mitchell Energy referred to both.96 On this ba-
sis, Mitchell Energy challenged the jury decision. In analyzing claims for
property damage to real property, it is important to understand the case
law in Texas governing permanent versus temporary injury to real prop-
erty. Permanent injury is one that is caused by an event or activity such
that the injury "is presumed to continue indefinitely; the injury must be
constant and continuous, not occasional, intermittent or recurrent. '97 A
temporary injury to real property is one that is recurrent, intermittent, or
occasional, such as one caused by rain or wind. There was apparently no
dispute that the plaintiffs in Mitchell Energy were seeking damages for
permanent injury because they described their injury as "ongoing and
continuous. 98




95. See id. at 436.
96. See id.




should stand, the court not only reversed but rendered the decision. 99
The court did so because it believed the issue was largely a legal one
based on uncontroverted facts; thus, there was nothing for the jury to
decide.1 0
In analyzing the question of whether a plaintiff must have known or
should have known of the cause of the injury, the court looked to the law
governing the discovery rule in permanent injury to real property
cases."1" The rule expounded by the Texas Supreme Court is that limita-
tions start to run "'upon discovery of the first actionable injury and not
on the date when the extent of the damages to the land are fully ascer-
tainable."'1" 2 In applying this rule, the Mitchell Energy court reasoned
that if discovery of the first actionable injury did not initiate the running
of limitations, then a plaintiff could wait until the full extent of the dam-
ages were determined before filing suit, and thereby allow the damages to
grow and maximize the damage award.1" 3
The court next considered how it should address what it considered
error by the trial court in submitting a question or instruction to the jury
regarding the discovery of the cause of the injury before the limitations
began to run.10 4 While noting that ordinarily an appellate court would
reverse and remand an issue to the trial court for a new jury finding, the
court determined that there was no factual issue for the jury to decide.10 5
The court reviewed the evidence in the record and concluded it showed
that all but a few of the numerous plaintiffs were aware of the injury-
alleged contamination of their groundwater-more than two years before
they filed suit against Mitchell Energy.10 6 The court concluded as a mat-
ter of law that those plaintiffs' claims were time-barred by the applicable
two-year statute of limitations.1°7 Knowledge that the water had a bad
odor or taste was sufficient notice of the injury. 0 8
b. To Use Fraudulent Concealment as a Means of Tolling the
Running of Limitations, Plaintiffs Must Prove Reasonable
Reliance on Statements by Defendants
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the statute of limi-
tations was tolled because Mitchell Energy had allegedly fraudulently
concealed the causes of action from the plaintiffs. 109 Frequently, plain-
tiffs in environmental torts allege fraudulent concealment to attempt to
99. See id. at 437.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 438.
102. Id. at 436 (quoting Bayouth, 671 S.W.2d at 868; Hues v. Warren Petro. Co., 814
S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied)).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 437.
106. See id. at 437-38.
107. See id. at 437.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 438.
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avoid their claims from being time-barred. The court considered Mitchell
Energy's appeal of the jury determination that Mitchell Energy had en-
gaged in fraudulent concealment."' The issue was whether there was no
evidence to support this jury finding. The relevant standard that the
court applied was whether "the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no
more than a mere scintilla of evidence."'
The element of fraudulent concealment that was central to the court's
analysis was reasonable reliance on deception by the defendant. Once a
plaintiff knows or should have known of the alleged fraud, then "reliance
is no longer reasonable, and the tolling effect ends."' " 2 The court con-
cluded that the evidence in the record did not reveal any reliance on
statements of either Mitchell Energy, or any statements by Mitchell En-
ergy passed on to the plaintiffs by the Texas Railroad Commission; thus,
the fraudulent concealment claim failed and the jury determination was
reversed.' 1 3 Despite any actions or statements by Mitchell Energy or the
Railroad Commission, the court determined that the plaintiffs were either
(1) still suspicious or believed that Mitchell Energy's wells were the cause
of the problems with their groundwater or (2) that some of the plaintiffs
had no contact with Mitchell Energy or the Railroad Commission at
all.1 14
c. The Continuing-Tort Doctrine Does Not Apply to Claims for
Permanent Injury to Land and Does Not Toll the
Running of Limitations
The next argument the plaintiffs made in order to prevent their claims
from being time barred was that their claims were for a "continuing-
tort."1 15 The continuing-tort doctrine is frequently asserted by plaintiffs
as another mechanism to attempt to avoid the application of the statute
of limitations to bar their claims. Under the continuing-tort doctrine, if
the defendant's tortious conduct and the resulting injury to plaintiff are
both ongoing and continuing, the statute of limitations is tolled or simply
does not begin to run until the tortious conduct ends."16 One example of
the application of this concept in Texas cited by the court is in cases in-
volving intentional infliction of emotional distress." 7
The court refused to apply the continuing-tort doctrine to cases involv-
110. See id.
111. Id. at 439 (citing Blount v. Bordens, Inc., 910 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex. 1995); Catalina
v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assoc.,
793 S.W.2d 660, 666 n. 9 (Tex. 1990); In re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661-62 (1951);
Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEx. L.
REV. 361, 362-63 (1960)).
112. Id. (citing Arabian Shield Dev. Co. v. Hunt, 808 S.W.2d 577, 585 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1991, writ denied)).
113. See id. at 442.
114. See id. at 440-43.
115. Id. at 443.
116. See id.




ing permanent injury to land. 118 The court cited numerous cases in which
Texas courts had refused to apply the continuing-tort doctrine and had
required that claims be made within two years of the first injury.119 The
application of statutes of limitations to permanent injuries to land by
Texas courts was determined to be directly contrary to the continuing-tort
doctrine. 120 The continuing-tort doctrine tolls limitations until the tor-
tious conduct ceases, and theoretically until the full extent of the damages
may be known. The rule for applying limitations to claims for permanent
injury to land is that the statute begins to run from the date the first
actionable injury is discovered and "not when the extent of the damages to
the land are fully ascertainable."'12 1 The court noted that the continuing-
tort doctrine is typically applied to tortious conduct which can be pre-
vented by a court injunction.122 While stating that temporary injury to
land might be prevented by injunction, a permanent injury could not be-
cause it will continue indefinitely.123
Plaintiffs argued that not all of their claims were for permanent injury
to land. They also asserted personal injuries. The appellate court ruled
that all of the alleged personal injuries were based upon permanent injury
to their land. The court ruled that because they based their claims on
permanent injury to land, they could not claim temporary damages on
appeal. Thus, all of the plaintiffs claims were barred.124
d. Except for the Claims of Three of the Seventeen Plaintiffs, No
Evidence Existed to Support the Jury Finding that the
Defendant Committed Fraud
Another claim that had been brought by plaintiffs was that Mitchell
Energy had committed fraud. The court addressed this claim in a manner
similar to how it addressed the fraudulent concealment argument as-
serted to defeat limitations. The court ruled that there was no evidence
to support the claim of fraud against all the plaintiffs except a few. The
claims of these persons had also been ruled not to be time-barred by
limitations.
118. See id.
119. See id. (citing Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Fromme, 269 S.W.2d 336, 337
(1954); Austin & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 15 S.W. 484, 485 (1891); Hues v. Warren
Petro. Co., 814 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied)).
120. See id.
121. Id. (quoting Bayouth, 671 S.W.2d at 868 (citing Tennessee Gas Transmission, 269
S.W.2d at 337)).
122. See id. n.8.
123. See id.
124. The plaintiffs also asserted constitutional challenges to the application of limita-
tions to their causes of action under theories of violation of due process, equal protection,
and the open courts provision of the Texas constitution. The court rejected these chal-
lenges as well. See id. at 444.
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2. All of the Plaintiffs' Claims Failed Because They Were Unsupported
by Sufficient Expert Testimony on Causation
In many environmental cases, a central challenge to plaintiffs' claims in
pretrial motions and at trial is whether the plaintiffs can prove the de-
fendant or defendants caused the injury allegedly suffered by plaintiffs.
In Mitchell Energy, this proved to be the ultimate success of the defend-
ant because no evidence existed to prove the defendant's gas wells con-
tributed hydrogen sulfide to plaintiffs' groundwater.) 25 Hydrogen sulfide
is often associated with the production of natural gas and specifically is
associated with natural gas wells in Wise County and certain Mitchell En-
ergy wells.
The key to the plaintiffs' claims was to show that hydrogen sulfide in
their water migrated from Mitchell Energy's wells. The plaintiffs' expert
testimony on this point was ruled to be insufficient under the standard
announced in the Texas Supreme Court decisions of Robinson and Hav-
ner, addressing the appropriate use of testifying experts.' 26 Both deci-
sions require that the expert's testimony be based upon a reliable
foundation; if not, then the expert's testimony is insufficient to support
the plaintiff's claim. 127
The plaintiffs had engaged two experts to testify at trial. One expert,
Joe Neal, was a petroleum engineer, the other Dr. Randy Bassett, a ge-
ochemist. The plaintiffs offered these two experts to testify that hydrogen
sulfide was present in the plaintiffs' groundwater and in Mitchell Energy's
gas wells, and that the hydrogen sulfide in the plaintiffs' groundwater
could have originated from Mitchell Energy's gas wells. 128
Mr. Neal testified that Mitchell Energy had not properly maintained its
wells. According to Mr. Neal, this improper maintenance resulted in the
likely leakage of Mitchell Energy gas into the Trinity Aquifer, from which
the plaintiffs would have drawn their water supply. The court ruled that
this was insufficient to prove Mitchell Energy caused the contamination
of plaintiffs' groundwater. The reasons were two-fold: (1) Mr. Neal did
not testify that gas from Mitchell Energy's wells was present in plaintiffs'
groundwater; and (2) Mr. Neal did not testify that either the plaintiffs'
groundwater or Mitchell Energy's gas wells contained hydrogen sul-
fide. 129 Thus, the court ruled that this testimony did not show that hydro-
gen sulfide from Mitchell Energy's gas wells had migrated into plaintiffs'
groundwater. 130
Dr. Bassett testified that with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty
(1) gas was present in plaintiffs' groundwater wells, (2) the gas in Mitchell
125. See id. at 447.
126. See id. at 446 (citing E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d
549 (Tex. 1995)); Havner 953 S.W.2d at 714).
127. See id.





Energy's four gas wells and plaintiffs' groundwater wells had the same
chemical makeup, (3) that hydrogen sulfide was present in plaintiffs'
groundwater wells, (4) hydrogen sulfide is a natural component of the
Mitchell Energy gas, and (5) that Mitchell Energy's wells "could have
been" the source of the hydrogen sulfide in plaintiffs' water.131
The court closely scrutinized Dr. Bassett's testimony. The court cited
Havner for the rule that the mere recitation of the "'magic' words 'rea-
sonable degree of [scientific] certainty,' alone, will not establish causa-
tion" through expert testimony.132 The expert's conclusion must be
supported by facts. 133 The court then applied this rule to several factual
issues reviewed by Dr. Bassett. The court appeared to require the follow-
ing analysis by Dr. Bassett: hydrogen sulfide is present in both Mitchell
Energy's wells and the hydrogen sulfide was released from Mitchell En-
ergy's gas wells in the area.134
The court concluded that Dr. Bassett's testimony did not provide a
scintilla of evidence on either factual question.1 35 With respect to proving
the presence of hydrogen sulfide in both locations, the court first consid-
ered Dr. Bassett's reliance on the 1976 Railroad Commission's tests of
Mitchell Energy's gas. The court determined that these tests showed the
gas wells contained hydrogen sulfide on one day and was absent a month
later. The court concluded this could not provide a reasonable basis for a
juror to conclude that Mitchell Energy's wells were the source of any
hydrogen sulfide in the plaintiffs' groundwater.136 This conclusion was
apparently reached because the absence of this gas in the second test
eliminated the evidence from a prior test that found gas was present.
Second, the court did not consider the isotopic signatures of gas in Mitch-
ell Energy's wells and plaintiffs' groundwater proof that hydrogen sulfide
was present in the gas wells or the groundwater as any proof that Mitchell
Energy's wells contaminated plaintiffs' groundwater.1 37 None of Dr. Bas-
sett's testimony or analysis showed any hydrogen sulfide in the gas wells
or the groundwater. Moreover, one of the Railroad Commission reports
he relied upon showed no hydrogen sulfide in one of the gas wells that
plaintiffs alleged released hydrogen sulfide into the groundwater.
According to the court, Dr. Bassett's most significant failure was his
inability to eliminate alternative potential causes of the presence of hy-
drogen sulfide in the plaintiffs' groundwater wells. The court cited the
Robinson case for the requirement that an expert must consider and elim-
inate alternative causes.138 Interestingly, Dr. Bassett testified on the is-
sue and concluded that the scientific method requires one to determine
131. See id. at 446-47
132. Id. at 447 (citing Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 712).
133. See id. (citing Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 712).
134. See id. at 447.
135. See id. at 448.
136. See id. at 448.
137. See id. at 447.
138. See id. at 448. (citing Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 559).
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which of alternative hypotheses has the highest scientific probability of
being correct. He admitted that the other gas wells in the area not owned
by Mitchell Energy would have similar, if not identical, isotopic signa-
tures to the gas in other gas wells in the area. Of the twenty-two gas wells
in the area, Mitchell Energy operated fewer than half. Thus, according to
the court, Dr. Bassett failed to eliminate other gas wells that could have
caused the release of hydrogen sulfide. 139 In addition, other evidence in-
troduced at trial indicated that hydrogen sulfide-releasing bacteria could
grow on the inside of the plaintiffs' water wells.
On the basis that Dr. Bassett failed to eliminate these alternative
causes, the court concluded Dr. Bassett's testimony involved "'little more
than speculation"" 40 Without a factual foundation that showed hydrogen
sulfide originated from Mitchell Energy's gas wells, and without eliminat-
ing other potential causes of the hydrogen sulfide in plaintiffs' ground-
water, the court ruled that Dr. Bassett's testimony provided no evidence
for proving the causal element of each of the plaintiffs' claims.
3. Analysis
This case provides a favorable decision to defendants in environmental
tort cases. The decision on the accrual date for claims for permanent
injury to land avoids a potentially longer running limitations period. It
creates a definite starting and ending point for the relevant length of time
a plaintiff has to bring suit. The date injury is discovered is usually easier
to prove than the date the cause is known or should have been known
through appropriate due diligence. The court's decision on fraudulent
concealment may help avoid this exception to the discovery rule by al-
lowing scrutiny of whether the plaintiffs really believed a defendant's
statement that it did not cause the harm. Finally, the ruling that the con-
tinuing-tort doctrine does not apply to claims arising from permanent in-
jury to land avoids what in some cases could be a complete lack of a
limitations period. In addition, if a permanent injury to land is defined as
one that is ongoing and continuous, and the continuing-tort doctrine were
applied to toll statutes of limitations, then the statute might never begin
to run.
The causation analysis requires specific scientific decisions on causation
by testifying experts. What is required is testimony showing a specific
causal link between the plaintiff's alleged injury and the defendant's con-
duct. The possibility that causation exists is insufficient. Thus, a clear
burden of causation, based on sound scientific evidence, must be shown.
139. See id.
140. Id. (citing Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 559).
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B. PLAINTIFFS MUST PROVIDE PROOF OF THE CAUSATION ELEMENT
OF NEGLIGENCE, TRESPASS, AND NUISANCE CLAIMS TO
AVOID SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As in Mitchell Energy, many of the major battles in litigation over envi-
ronmental releases or contamination involve causation questions that are
fought through summary judgment motions. In Cain v. Rust Industrial
Cleaning Services, Inc.,141 the defendant filed a motion for summary judg-
ment with supporting expert affidavits which opined that no contamina-
tion from Enclean's activities migrated on to Cain's property. This case
provides precedent for challenging plaintiffs' cases on the basis of proof
of causation.
This case should be of particular interest to environmental consulting
and remediation firms, as well as the individuals or entities that engage
such firms to perform environmental remediation. In Cain, the plaintiffs
asserted contaminants were transported onto their property by
stormwater runoff that occurred during remediation on adjacent prop-
erty. Because such an event could potentially occur in a variety of
remediation activities, parties performing remediation activities should
consider these risks.
Rust Industrial Cleaning Services, Inc. was the successor to other com-
panies that had apparently engaged in the remediation. The court re-
ferred to these companies collectively as "Enclean."'1 42 The plaintiffs
owned property that had been contaminated by arsenic by a prior owner,
Hi-Yield, which had also contaminated the adjoining property owned by
a railroad. Enclean was hired to remediate the soils on the railroad prop-
erty in response to a Texas Water Commission order) 43 The plaintiffs
had refused to comply with a similar order, and instead, closed their fur-
niture manufacturing business and abandoned the manufacturing facility.
The basis for the lawsuit was that Enclean had caused even more arse-
nic-containing soil to be transported in stormwater runoff onto plaintiffs'
property.144 There were two critical issues for the district court to decide
in responding to the motion for summary judgment. The first issue was
whether Enclean had presented sufficient proof to show that it had not
contaminated plaintiffs' property, and the second issue was whether the
plaintiffs had presented any evidence to contradict defendants' evidence.
On appeal, the issues centered on the sufficiency of the expert affidavits
and a factual dispute as to whether any arsenic-containing soils had
washed onto plaintiffs' property as a result of Enclean's activities on the
adjacent railroad property. Specifically, the plaintiffs' claim was that a
heavy rainstorm washed the arsenic-containing soil onto the Cain prop-
141. 969 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana, 1998, pet. denied).
142. See id. at 464.
143. This agency is now known as the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission.
144. See id. at 466.
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erty.' 45 The plaintiffs urged that this was proved by the orange coloration
left by ferrous sulfate used by Enclean on the adjacent property.
1. Plaintiffs Are Required to Demonstrate a Causal Basis for Their
Claims, Once the Defendant Submits Proof Challenging
Causation
Before discussing the actual issues on appeal, it is important to evalu-
ate the elements of Cain's claims. As is typical in environmental tort
cases, Cain asserted negligence, trespass, and nuisance claims. The ele-
ments of negligence include a breach of a legal duty that proximately
caused an injury. 146 Trespass claims involve the entry in person or by a
person allowing "a thing to cross the boundary of a property. ' 147 Finally,
the appellate court listed three ways in which a nuisance may occur, only
one of which the court concluded was relevant to the plaintiffs' claims:
"physical harm to property, such as encroachment of a damaging
substance .... ",148
To show for purposes of its summary judgment motion that the plain-
tiffs could not prevail on these three causal elements of their claims, the
defendants submitted two expert affidavits. The first affidavit was sub-
mitted by Davis L. Ford. Mr. Ford's affidavit set forth his educational
background and his experience working at hazardous waste sites for over
thirty years.' 49 The affidavit listed an extensive list of documents he had
reviewed, including the Texas Water Commission approved closure plan
and ultimate approval of the closure of the site. The expert concluded
there was nothing to indicate that any act of Enclean's activities had con-
taminated any adjacent property. Another affidavit was authored by
Randy Tarpley, who opined there was no devaluation of the plaintiffs'
property caused by Enclean's activities. 1511
2. A Party Objecting to Expert Affidavits Must Show That the
Affidavits Fail the Robinson Standard and Obtain a Written
Decision from the Court in Order to Appeal an
Adverse Ruling
The trial court relied upon one or both of these affidavits in concluding
that Enclean had offered proof that Cain could not meet the causal ele-
ment of its causes of action. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged these
affidavits. The first issue involved the plaintiffs' failure to obtain a writ-
ten ruling on objections to the affidavits. The plaintiffs also asserted that
145. See id. at 468.
146. See id. at 468 (citing Aim v. Aluminum Co. of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tex.
1986); Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990)).
147. Id. at 470 (citing Glade v. Dietert, 156 Tex. 382, 295 S.W.2d 642, 645 (1956)).
148. Id. (citing Ward v. Northeast Texas Farmers Co-op Elevator, 909 S.W.2d 143, 151
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Products
Co., 893 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-Houston f1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied)).
149. See id. at 467.
150. See id. at 468.
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the Ford affidavit did not list sufficient qualifications as an expert. There-
fore, Ford's assertions were mere legal conclusions and not sufficient
summary judgment evidence. The appellate court disagreed, holding that
the affidavit sufficiently described Ford's education and thirty years of
experience in the environmental engineering field. 151 The affidavit also
listed the large number of documents that Ford reviewed in formulating
his opinion. 152
The court concluded that Ford had the sufficient level of expertise to
opine on whether Enclean had exercised the proper standard of care. 153
The court also pointed out that in a case like this an expert is required
because the standard of care involves a specialized area of science. 154
Guided by the recent Texas Supreme Court's decision in E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson,155 the appellate court concluded that
an expert must testify as to "whether appropriate procedures were used
by the remediator."1 56 The court ultimately decided that Ford's affidavit
was proper summary judgment proof because it set out (1) his qualifica-
tions, (2) the relevant facts that he relied upon, and (3) his conclusions
based upon those facts. 157
With respect to Tarpley's affidavit, the appellate court denied the plain-
tiffs' challenge as well. The court stated that the plaintiffs did not identify
any authority requiring the affiant "not only to state that he has such
personal knowledge about the realty, but also to explain how he obtained
the personal knowledge about the property."'1 58
3. If Expert Affidavits Are Not Defective, the Opposing Party Must
Demonstrate Fact Issues to Defeat Summary Judgment
In essence, the appellate court required the plaintiffs to show they had
provided evidence that raised a factual controversy on the causation is-
sue; that is, the plaintiffs were required to show arsenic-containing soil
had migrated through rainwater onto the plaintiffs' property, in addition
to the arsenic that was already present on the property, as a result of
Enclean's activities. 159 The plaintiffs relied upon the fact that surface
water had run off of the railroad property onto their property. Enclean
had brought ferrous sulfate onto the railroad property to use in the
remediation process. Part of the remediation process involved removal
of the arsenic-containing soil. Another part of the remediation con-
cerned the mixing of ferrous sulfate with soil left in place combined with
additional clean soil brought from an off-site source. The Cains' sole ba-
151. See id. at 467.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 468.
154. See id.
155. 923 S.W.2d 549, 559-60 (Tex. 1995).
156. Cain, 969 S.W.2d at 468.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See id. n.11.
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sis for arguing additional arsenic-containing soil washed onto their prop-
erty was that the orange runoff colored by ferrous sulfate had stained
their property.
Enclean, however, provided summary judgment proof that it did not
engage in the earth moving activities that the plaintiffs alleged caused the
soil migration until after the relevant heavy rainstorm. The ferrous sul-
fate was placed on the railroad property before the storm and before it
was mixed with the soil left in place. The court also pointed out that En-
clean had provided evidence that it excavated a twenty foot wide ditch to
prevent runoff onto the adjacent property in the event of rain. Thus, in
the court's view, the ferrous sulfate that washed onto the Cains' property
did not contain any arsenic-containing soil that migrated as a result of
Enclean's earth moving activities. 160
Cain argued that he had met his burden of proof that additional arse-
nic-containing soil washed onto his property since water runs in a down-
hill pattern. The court, however, identified the flaw in this argument.
The claims were filed against Enclean, not the owner of the property. In
order to prevail against Enclean, the court required that the plaintiffs
show something that Enclean did caused contaminated soil to migrate to
the plaintiffs' property. The fact that it rained and contaminated soil had
migrated did not create any claim against the non-owner of the property.
In essence, the court was stating that no duty existed on Enclean's part to
stop all runoff onto the plaintiffs' land. In addition, the court indicated at
one point that a landowner downhill must accept runoff from the natural
flow from higher ground.' 6 '
Cain testified that Enclean had disturbed the property prior to the rele-
vant rainstorm. The appellate court found that this testimony was insuf-
ficient to raise a factual issue because Cain did not testify whether this
area of the railroad property drained onto his property. Enclean had pro-
vided evidence that the only area of the railroad property that was dis-
turbed prior to the rainstorm drained away from the Cains' property.
The court noted that no other evidence was submitted by the plaintiffs to
controvert Enclean's summary judgment evidence. 162
The court specifically noted the fact that ferrous sulfate migrated onto
Plaintiffs' property did not show that contaminated soil washed onto their
property. 163 No soil analysis or other means of proving this occurred was
provided by the Cains. The court would not accept the presumption that
soil moved with the ferrous sulfate in the stormwater runoff.164 The court
also would not accept a second necessary presumption that if soil mi-
160. See id. at 469-70.
161. See id. at 469 (citing Bunch v. Thomas, 49 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. 1932); Jefferson Cty.
Drainage Dist. No. 6 v. Lower Neches Valley Auth., 876 S.W.2d 940, 950 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1994, writ denied)).
162. See id. at 469-70




grated onto the plaintiffs' property, it necessarily contained arsenic.165
Having failed to controvert Enclean's evidence that no additional con-
taminated soil ran off onto their property, the Cains failed to defeat En-
clean's motion for summary judgment. Thus, the court upheld the district
court's granting of summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims for negli-
gence, trespass, and nuisance.
C. THE DUTY TO SUBSEQUENT LANDOWNER FOR DANGEROUS
CONDITION ON LAND Is LIMITED
An area of law frequently litigated in environmental tort cases is the
question of what duty a prior landowner owes to subsequent owners of
the land. This issue was the main point of contention in an appeal of a
summary judgment awarded in favor of a prior landowner. In Hicks v.
Humble Oil and Refining Co., 166 subsequent landowners sued an oil com-
pany for alleged personal injuries. The plaintiffs claimed that these per-
sonal injuries were caused by drinking groundwater contaminated by
crude oil that was stored in crude oil pits on the property.
The background of this case is not unlike other cases filed against oil
companies by owners of property where crude oil was once stored in their
pits. In 1921, Humble Oil and Refining Company, which is now Exxon
Corporation (Exxon), purchased a 45-acre tract of land in Webster,
Texas. Two pits were excavated and covered with wooden covers. The
pits were used for the storage of crude oil. Subsequently, Exxon ceased
using the pits and, in 1945, conveyed the property to Thomas H. Hicks
(Hicks). Hicks was aware that the pits were present on the property and
that crude oil had been stored in the pits. While the deed did not men-
tion the pits, Hicks had signed an affidavit in 1958 in which he stated that
he was aware of the pits and that they were used to store crude oil. No
evidence was presented by the plaintiffs that Hicks was not aware of the
pits or the storage of crude oil. Plaintiffs argued, however, that Hicks was
never notified of contamination of the land and that Hicks, as an unedu-
cated man, was not aware of the toxic contamination that could arise
from such pits.167
1. A Seller of Land Is Not Liable for Claims for Dangerous
Conditions on Land After Sale Unless the Seller Does Not
Disclose or Actively Conceals the Existence of the
Condition
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston considered the
fundamental issue of whether any duty was owed for subsequent physical
injuries by a seller of land to the purchaser or other parties once the land
is sold. The general rule cited by the court is that a vendor of real prop-
165. See id.
166. 970 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]1998, pet. denied).
167. See id. at 93.
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erty is generally not liable for injuries caused by "dangerous conditions"
present on the property after title to the property is conveyed by the ven-
dor.168 The exception cited by the court is when a dangerous condition is
present on the property at the time of conveyance and the seller "does
not disclose or actively conceals the existence of the condition."' 69 How-
ever, this exception does not apply when "the vendee discovers or should
have discovered the dangerous condition and has a reasonable opportu-
nity to take precautions, or when the vendee has actual notice of the con-
dition. ' 1711 The interesting aspect of the case is that plaintiffs argued that
actual notice was required of the contamination or the toxicity of the con-
tamination, not the mere presence of the pits. They argued that Exxon
did not disclose the contamination that might arise from the pits.
The court, however, did not adopt this reasoning. The court noted no
cases had been cited that held the resulting danger from conditions on
property is what must be disclosed, or for which the buyer of land must
receive notice, rather than the condition itself.171 In other words, the
Hicks court considered the oil pits to be the dangerous condition.172 On
this basis, the court ruled, per First Financial, that no duty was owed
Hicks or the other plaintiffs and summary judgment on this basis was
proper. 173
2. Negligence Per Se Is Inapplicable Because the Texas Water Pollution
Act of 1961, the Texas Water Quality Act of 1957, Chapter 26 of the
Texas Water Code, the Texas Clean Air Act of 1987, and the Texas
Sanitation and Health Act Do Not Apply Retroactively to Activities
Occurring Before Their Passage into Law
The next issue the court addressed was whether Exxon was liable under
a negligence per se claim. 174 As the basis for their negligence per se
claims, the plaintiffs cited several statutes and a Texas Railroad Commis-
sion rule that they claimed Exxon violated. 175 The first step in the court's
analysis was to review the statutes that the plaintiffs claimed Exxon vio-
lated. The statutes were the Texas Water Pollution Control Act of 1961,
the Texas Water Quality Act of 1957, Chapter 26 of the Texas Water
Code, the Texas Clean Air Act of 1987, and the Sanitation and Health
168. See id. at 93 (citing First Fin. Dev. Corp. v. Hughston, 797 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied)).
169. Id. (citing First Financial, 797 S.W.2d at 291).
170. Id. (citing First Financial, 797 S.W.2d at 291-92). The court in First Financial cited
Section 353(2) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. However, as the court in Hicks
noted, the Texas Supreme Court has not yet adopted Section 353 of the Restatement be-
cause it concluded that Section 353 did not apply to the facts of the particular case in which
the issue arose. See Hicks, 970 S.W.2d at 93 (citing Lefmark Management Co. v. Old, 946
S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. 1997)).
171. See Hicks, 970 S.W.2d at 93-94.






Act of former article 4477-1 of 1987.176
The court addressed these statutes by considering whether they were
retroactive in application to activities that occurred before 1945. The
court concluded that statutes are presumed by courts not to be retroac-
tive "unless it is clear from a fair reading of the statute that the legislature
intended it to apply to both past and present controversies." 177 The court
also cited Section 311.022 of the Texas Government Code, which states "a
statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly
made retrospective.' 1 78 The court then cited a prior Texas appellate
court decision that held that "a statute is retroactive and prohibited if it
impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws."'1 79 The court applied
these tests in reviewing the environmental statutes cited by the plaintiffs.
It concluded that the statutes did not provide any language that would
retroactively apply their prohibitions or restrictions "to Exxon's use of
the land in the 1920's.13180
3. Negligence Per Se Does Not Apply Where the Statute or Regulation
Was Not Intended to Protect the Class of People That
Includes the Plaintiffs
The court then turned to a review of Rule 39 of the Railroad Commis-
sion order. 181 This rule provided that storage of oil in open earthen pits is
prohibited unless the Commission grants special permission in an order in
response to an unforeseen emergency.182 The Rule further stated that
where such storage is occurring at the time the rule was effective, it was
required to be discontinued within a reasonable period of time. 183 This
rule was adopted in 1920.184 Exxon argued that this rule was designed to
prevent the waste of oil and gas and not to protect human health.185 Ex-
xon concluded that this rule could not then serve as a basis for a negli-
gence per se claim because the plaintiffs were not within the class for
whom the rule was designed to protect.186
The Texas Supreme Court has adopted the concept of negligence per se
found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 288B (1965).187
Under this rule, a court must adopt the statute or administrative regula-
tion as the standard of care. 188 But the Houston appellate court did not
176. This statute is now codified in the TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 341.001
et seq. (Vernon 1992).
177. Hicks, 970 S.W. 2d at 94 (citing Ex Parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. 1981)).
178. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.022 (Vernon 1992).
179. Id. (citing Trahan v. Trahan, 894 S.W.2d 113, 118 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ












find any court that had adopted rule 39 as the standard of care. 189 Citing
Texas Supreme court precedent, the Houston appellate court stated that a
court will not adopt a statute or regulation as the measure of the standard
of care unless it is designed to protect from the particular hazard the class
of persons of which the plaintiff is a member.191' Under this analysis, the
appellate court ruled that Rule 39 was promulgated by the Railroad
Commission under statutory provisions and in the context of efforts to
prevent waste of and to conserve oil and gas in Texas.19' The plaintiffs
therefore did not fall within the class of people to be protected, and the
hazard complained of did not qualify as the problem Rule 39 was
designed to address. 192 The court then upheld the grant of summary
judgment as to the plaintiffs' claim of negligence per se.193
4. Landowner Cannot Bring Nuisance Claims Against a Former Owner
of the Same Property
As mentioned in the previous discussion of the Cain case, nuisance is a
frequent cause of action in environmental tort suits. Where suit is filed
by a party who purchased the property from the defendant or a subse-
quent landowner, a particular difficulty arises when attempting to main-
tain this theory of recovery. In the Hicks case, the plaintiffs alleged
nuisance as one of their causes of action.194 Exxon cited Jones v. Texaco,
Inc.195 for the proposition that a current landowner cannot maintain a
claim of nuisance against a prior landowner for activities occurring on the
property when the prior landowner held title.196 In Jones, Texaco had
disposed of oil sediment and other wastes in earthen pits on land at the
time Texaco had owned the land. At the time Jones purchased the land
from Texaco, the pits were apparently covered and waste did not begin to
seep out until after the sale was complete. Jones filed suit claiming negli-
gence, gross negligence, and strict liability. While the court in Jones did
not recognize the doctrine of strict liability in the context of an environ-
mental suit, the court ruled that Texaco "was not responsible for harming
land it owned at the time it engaged in the offensive activity."1 97 Consid-
ering the Jones case as relevant precedent, the Hicks court upheld Ex-
xon's summary judgment on the grounds that a nuisance claim required
harm to land of another, not land it owned.1 98
189. See id. (citing Carter v. William Sommerville and Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278(Tex. 1979); Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 324 S.W.2d 201, 205 (1959); Moughon v.
Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. 1978)).





194. See id. at 92.
195. 945 F. Supp. 1037, 1051 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
196. See Hicks, 970 S.W.2d at 96.




5. Strict Products Liability Does Not Apply to Claims for Oil Stored in
Pits
For a similar reason, the court rejected the plaintiffs strict liability
claims. As in Jones, the Hicks court concluded that the harm must be to
another party even if Texas courts had adopted strict liability under the
products liability doctrine or abnormally dangerous activities sections of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.199 More importantly, as the federal
district court held in Jones, the Hicks court ruled that Texas courts have
not adopted Sections 402A involving products liability in cases where oil
has been stored in pits and that the abnormally dangerous activities pro-
vision under Sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement had not been
adopted by Texas courts either.200
Without some other claim, the Houston court of appeals ruled that no
basis for liability had been pled by the plaintiffs that survived Exxon's
motion for summary judgment. Thus, the trial court's judgment was
affirmed.
The court's analysis of the issues of the harm done to property by a
seller or prior owner of real property is consistent with a majority of
other Texas case law. Another aspect that was not discussed is the law of
caveat emptor, which still applies in Texas to sales of real property. The
analysis of the "dangerous conditions" issue is similar to the law of caveat
emptor. The dangerous conditions cases and the Restatement (Second)
of Torts Sections 351-353 appear to address personal injury to a buyer or
third parties after purchase of the lands. In Cain,201 the plaintiffs sought
relief for alleged personal injuries purportedly caused by consuming con-
taminated groundwater. An interesting question would be whether the
same analysis would apply to claims for diminution in property values or
to recover environmental remediation costs.
Another interesting aspect of the court's decision involved the implica-
tion for retroactive liability under other environmental statutes. Federal
courts have determined that, despite the lack of express language in the
statute, the structure of the statute and its legislative history demon-
strated a clear Congressional intent that liability under the federal Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act20 2
(known as the "Superfund" statute), for example, should be applied ret-
roactively.20 3 While this may be a convenient rationalization to avoid
laws prohibiting retroactive effect and constitutional infirmity, this is gen-
erally how federal courts have used the federal Superfund statute to im-
pose liability for remediation of contamination resulting from actions that
occurred decades before the statute was passed.204 The Hicks case raises
199. See id. at 97.
200. See id. at 97.
201. 969 S.W.2d at 464.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1998).
203. See, e.g. United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1056, 1511-15 (11th Cir. 1997).
204. See id. But see Superfund: Asarco seeks Dismissal of $1 Billion Suit, Citing Recent
Decision on Retroactivity 29, BNA Envt'l Rep. 1107 (Oct. 2, 1998) (reporting arguments
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questions as to whether Texas courts will interpret Texas statutes to allow
such a retroactive effect.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACT PROVISIONS
A. FOR PURPOSES OF AN INDEMNITY AGREEMENT, A CLAIM DOES
NOT ACCRUE UNTIL THE STATUTE CREATING THE CAUSE
OF ACTION IS ENACTED.
In Fina, Inc. v. Arco,205 the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Texas held that, under Texas law, an indemnification provi-
sion in a sales agreement signed in 1973 covered liability for cost recovery
actions brought under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Cleanup, and Liability Act (CERCLA).20 6 Whether the indemnity provi-
sion covered liability under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act, and the Texas Water
Code was not contested. But the federal district court noted the Hicks
opinion, which concluded that the Texas environmental statutes listed
above only applied prospectively, not retroactively to acts or omissions
occurring before enactment of the statutes.2117 The court granted sum-
mary judgment to the defendants on the CERCLA claims, holding that
the indemnity provided by Fina, the purchaser of the refinery, covered
the CERCLA claims Fina filed against the seller and the other prior
owner whom the seller had indemnified. This decision was based on the
conclusion that the language of the indemnity applied to claims that ac-
crued after the sale, and any CERCLA claim could only accrue when
CERCLA was enacted seven years after the sales agreement was
executed. 20 8
The background of this case is important in understanding how the
court addressed the issue. Defendant Atlantic Ritchfield Corporation
(Arco) constructed an oil refinery in the 1920s. It sold the refinery in
1968 to British Petroleum, Inc. (BP) and Sohio Pipeline Company (SPL).
In 1973, BP and SPL sold the refinery to Fina, Inc. (Fina) as part of an
asset sale.209 The indemnification provision that was part of the 1973 as-
set sales agreement read as follows:
Fina shall indemnify, defend, and hold harmless BP and SPL against
all claims, actions, demands, losses or liabilities arising from the use
or the operation of the Assets, or arising under or relating to any
lease, contract, license or other agreement assigned to or assumed by
that the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131
(1998) renders the Superfund law unconstitutional if applied retroactively).
205. 16 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
206. See id. at 726.
207. See id. at 721 n.8.
208. See id. at 721.
209. See id. Also a plaintiff in the lawsuit was Fina, Inc.'s successor-in-interest, Fina Oil
and Chemical Company. The 1973 sales agreement provided that it would be binding upon
Fina, Inc.'s successors and assigns. See id.
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Fina or a subsidiary of Fina and accruing from and after closing.210
Fina ultimately assigned the agreements or assets to another Fina-re-
lated company. The sales agreement between Arco and BP and SPL con-
tained virtually identical indemnity language to the indemnity language
between Fina and BP and SPL. This created, in the court's view, a circu-
lar indemnity between Arco, BP, SPL, and Fina.211 The court held that
Fina's indemnity passed through BP to Arco,2 12 but also noted that BP
and Arco had stipulated that any obligation to indemnify Arco belonged,
in turn, to BP.213 Fina contended that it only became aware of certain
areas of contamination at the refinery in 1990 and brought an action to
recover costs of clean-up. 21 4 Fina alleged that the contamination was
caused by the activities of Arco, BP, and SPL at the refinery from some-
time between the 1920's until the date of closing in 1973.215 Both the
defendants and the plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment and the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court ruled on the motion for
summary judgment in favor of defendants under the indemnity
agreements.2 16
In analyzing the construction of the indemnities, the court first consid-
ered whether the doctrines of "express negligence" and "express strict
liability" applied to the indemnity language at issue.217 These doctrines
require that contract provisions purporting to indemnify the indemnitee
against its own negligence or strict liability must express this intent in
specific terms within the contract's four corners.218 The court concluded
that these doctrines did not apply because the doctrines generally only
apply to indemnity language that attempts to relieve a party of its liability
in advance for future actions.219 The court determined that the oil com-
panies had drawn a "bright line" dividing liability accruing before and
after the date of closing, and it was clear that the parties had not intended
the indemnity provisions (which, after all, were drafted by "sophisticated
businessmen, international oil companies, and corporate attorneys") to
apply to future acts.220 The Fina decision did not include a discussion of
how the indemnity language at issue would have been analyzed had the
doctrines been held to apply.
Although the Fina court's holding may have applied to the plaintiff's
cost recovery claims brought under the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA), the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act, and the Texas
210. Id.
211. See id. at 719.
212. See id. at 726.
213. See id. at 720.
214. See id. at 720.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 719.
217. Id. at 721-22.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 722 (citing Green Int'l, Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. 1996);




Water Code, the defendant's argument was rooted in-and the Fina court
limited its explicit analysis to-the plaintiff's CERCLA claims.22' The
Fina court cited a Fifth Circuit decision for the proposition that, if the
intent of the parties is manifested in broad enough language, an indem-
nity provision entered into prior to the enactment of CERCLA could
apply to CERCLA liability. 222
Key to the district court's decision granting summary judgment for de-
fendants in Fina was the question of when the cause of action "accrued."
As the purported conduct by the sellers occurred well before the enact-
ment of the environmental statutes under which the purchaser's clean-up
liabilities arose, the purchasers claimed that the term "accruing" referred
to "complet[ion] of the factual predicates or actions leading to subse-
quent liability. '223 Ultimately, it was held that the claim accrued when
the legal right to file suit came into existence, i.e., when the statutes au-
thorizing the claims were enacted. 224
As the nature of environmental contamination is such that it may be
discovered years, or even decades, after the actions that caused it, the
Fina case provides important guidance on how typical indemnification
provisions, which may have themselves been drafted long before the ma-
jor state and federal environmental laws were enacted, may be inter-
preted under Texas law. In reviewing prior indemnities or drafting new
indemnities that may cover environmental claims, it is important to con-
sider this case. A practitioner should be careful to consider this court's
interpretation of "accrue" and perhaps use language that addresses any
claims arising from conditions existing at or before the time of closing and
conditions existing after closing. Fina interpreted the indemnity it had
given to BP and SPL to apply to all condition existing on or before clos-
ing. The court concluded that this would only apply to causes of action for
such conditions that accrue after closing.2 2 5 Interestingly, if the discovery
rule applied to claims for pre-closing conditions, then arguably, the buyer,
rather than the seller, would be liable for all claims discovered after the
closing.
221. See id. at 721, 722 nA 1, 726.
222. See id. at 721 (citing Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 40 F.3d 750 (5th Cir.
1994)).
223. Id. at 721.
224. See id. at 722-23, 726 (citing Ferguson v. Johnston, 320 S.W.2d 906, 911 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hensley v. Conway, 29 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1930, no writ)). While noting that state law governs the interpretation of
indemnification provisions, and that the 1973 sales agreement contained a Delaware
choice-of-law provision, the court found that the result would be the same whether Dela-
ware or Texas law applied.
225. Fina, 16 F. Supp. at 726.
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VI. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
SHAREHOLDERS
A. SHAREHOLDERS WHO SIPHONED OFF ASSETS OF A CORPORATION
FOUND LIABLE FOR PLUGGING AND ABANDONING COSTS
UNDER THEORY THAT THEY OPERATED THE
CORPORATION AS A SHAM TO
PERPETRATE A FRAUD
Love v. State226 affirmed a district court's decision holding former
shareholders and directors of a corporation individually liable for the cor-
poration's failure to plug inactive oil and gas wells. 227 This case provides
an important analysis of how the "corporate veil" can be pierced to im-
pose liability on individuals for pollution caused by corporations in which
the individuals hold or previously held an interest.
Love v. State centered around a corporation, Sopresa Petroleum, Inc.
(Sopresa), owned and operated by the appellants, Jeff L. Love and Daniel
L. Welch.228 The evidence presented at trial suggested that the wells on
two of the leases owned and operated by Sopresa-those on two leases,
one known as the VIM lease and one known as the Klein lease-were
inactive as early as 1982.229 In contrast, a third lease owned by Sopresa,
known as the "Ogden lease," was evidently producing in marketable
quantities. In 1984, and again in March and October of 1986, the Texas
Railroad Commission sent notices to Sopresa of several violations of the
Commission's rules at the VIM and Klein locations, including failure to
plug abandoned oil wells and to cleanups, oil spills and pollution.2 30
Then, in December of 1986, Sopresa sold its interest in the "Ogden lease"
to a different company, Calidad Petroleum, which was also owned by the
appellants. 231 The remaining assets of Sopresa were the VIM and Klein
leases. Additionally, days after the sale of the Ogden lease, the appel-
lants sold Sopresa to a third party for $1000.232
In 1988, the Railroad Commission sent Sopresa notice of a formal
hearing for the violations on the VIM lease. In 1992 the Commission did
the same for the Klein lease.2 33 The Railroad Commission then plugged
and abandoned all the wells and attempted to assess administrative pen-
alties.2 34 Because these efforts apparently failed, a lawsuit was filed by
the state against Sopresa, Love, and Welch.235 As to the individual liabil-
ity of Love and Welch, the state advanced three theories: (1) that Love
and Welch, in failing to file a franchise tax report, were liable pursuant to
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Section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code; (2) the corporation was an alter
ego of the individual owners; and (3) the corporation was operated as a
sham to perpetuate a fraud.236
On appeal, the court concluded that Love and Welch could not be held
liable for their failure to file a tax report, because the jury did not find
that Love and Welch were shareholders, officers, or directors when the
final administrative orders were issued or when the wells were
plugged.237 The jury did find, however, that both Love and Welch had
operated the corporation as a sham to perpetuate a fraud and that Love
had been the alter ego of Sopresa. 238
This split result spawned the first issue considered on appeal: whether
the jury finding on the tax code issue was in fatal conflict with the jury
finding on the sham to perpetuate a fraud and alter ego theories. 239 Spe-
cifically, the appellants claimed that the jury's failure to find that the ap-
pellants were shareholders, officers, and directors on the specific dates of
the final administrative orders and well pluggings could not be reconciled
with the finding that the appellants used Sopresa as a sham to perpetuate
a fraud and that Love was Sopresa's alter ego.24 °
In addressing this issue, the court relied upon the Texas Supreme Court
case of Bender v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 2 4 1 Bender held that
when a court reviews jury findings for conflict, the threshold question is
whether the findings are about the same material fact.242 The appeals
court, however, noting that there were many prior cases where individu-
als had been "held liable under the sham theory long after the corpora-
tion in which the individual had some prior interest is dissolved,
bankrupt, or sold," held that the "shareholder status of the individual at
the time liability is assessed or at the time the [Railroad] Commission's
orders became final is not a prerequisite to liability under the sham-to-
perpetuate-a-fraud theory. ' 243 With respect to the alter ego theory ap-
plied to Love, the court saw no need to decide the fatal conflict allega-
tion, since the sham to perpetuate a fraud theory was a valid, separate
basis to hold Love liable. 244 But the court, in citing Stewart & Stevenson
236. See id.
237. See id. at 117. Section 171.255(a) of the Texas Tax Code provides in part that "[i]f
the corporate privileges of a corporation are forfeited for the failure to file a report or pay
a tax or penalty, each director or officer of the corporation is liable for each debt of the
corporation that is created or incurred in this state after the date on which the report, tax,
or penalty is due and before the corporate privileges are revived." TEX. TAX. CODE ANN.
§ 171.255(a) (Vernon 1998) (emphasis added).
238. See Love, S.W.2d at 116-117.
239. See id. at 117.
240. See id.
241. 600 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. 1980).
242. See Love, 972 S.W.2d at 117 (quoting Bender, 600 S.W.2d at 260).
243. fd.(citing Huff v. Harrell, 941 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996,





v. Serv-Tech, Inc.,245 implied that the court may have reached a different
result on the fatal conflict issue with regard to the alter ego theory.246
The next issue considered on appeal was whether it was necessary for
there to be evidence that Love and Welch were actually shareholders.247
The appellate court determined that no such evidence was necessary,
since there was no dispute that Love and Welch were shareholders, of-
ficers, and directors for the relevant time.248 Following the logic applied
to the fatal conflict issue, the court held that the appellants "cannot es-
cape liability merely because they were no longer in those positions when
the wells were plugged or the final orders entered. '249
Third, the appeals court considered whether evidence of actual fraud
was necessary in order for the appellants to be held liable under the sham
to perpetuate a fraud theory.250 Both appellants and the appellate court
focused their attentions on Article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corpora-
tion Act, which states:
A holder of share[s], an owner of any beneficial interest in shares,....
or any affiliate thereof or of the corporation shall be under no obli-
gation to the corporation or its obligees with respect to: any contrac-
tual obligation of the corporation or any matter relating to or arising
from the obligation on the basis that the holder, owner, subscriber,
or affiliate is or was the alter ego of the corporation, or on the basis
of actual fraud or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetuate a fraud,
or other similar theory, unless the obligee demonstrates that the
holder . . . did perpetuate an actual fraud on the obligee .... 251
The court's view was that this language required that an actual fraud be
proven only with respect to claims for contractual obligations. 252 The
court concluded that debts arising from the State's claims relating to vio-
lations of rules for the prevention and control of pollution and for reim-
bursement of plugging expenses are "fundamentally different from
contractual obligations. '253  Thus, no finding of actual fraud was
required. 254
Finally, the appellants made a general challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence that there was in fact a sham to perpetuate a fraud. The
court, however, pointed to the evidence that Love and Welch, "on behalf
245. 879 S.W.2d 89, 108 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). The Love
court cited this case for the proposition that if the "basis for disregarding [the] corporate
fiction is alter ego[,] it is necessary that there be some financial interest, ownership, or
control by [the] individual sought to be held liable for [the] tort of the corporation." Love,
972 S.W.2d at 117 n.3.
246. See Love, 972 S.W.2d at 117 n.3.
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of Sopresa, [had] transferred to their other company, Calidad, Sopresa's
most valuable asset, the Ogden lease, shortly after the [Railroad] Com-
mission sent notice of the violations and just days before they allegedly
sold Sopresa to [the third party in 1986]. ''255 Love and Welch disputed
evidence that they were aware of the regulatory violations on the leases
before this sale. Nevertheless, the court noted:
The [Railroad] Commission had notified appellants that their wells
were in violation of the law. The jury could have reasonably con-
cluded that any sale of the corporation was part of a sham to perpet-
uate a fraud upon the [Railroad] Commission by selling a company
with thousands of dollars of potential liabilities in penalties and very
few assets. On the other hand, the jury may have believed appel-
lant's testimony that they were not aware of the violations until 1988
because they had not been out to the oil-well sites for several years.
This irresponsibility and neglect of a potential environmental hazard
may have led the jury to find Love and Welch ignored their statutory
obligations because they thought they could hide behind the corpo-
rate veil.2 56
The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
conclude that the defendants manipulated the corporate form for the pur-
pose of avoiding the statutory obligations that were imposed upon the
closely held corporation.2 57 The court cited other decisions in which
shareholders had taken steps to "siphon off revenues and sell assets, or
do other acts to hinder the company's ability to pay its debts, such as start
up a new business with the same shareholders. 2 58
In upholding the jury finding and district court judgment on the issue
of operating a corporation as a sham to perpetuate a fraud, 259 the opinion
raises concerns about the extent to which a shareholder must maintain
assets in a company when it has received notice of potential environmen-
tal liabilities. Perhaps the facts of this case were fairly obvious to this
appellate court. But in today's corporate environment where companies
are bought and sold, corporate structures are changed in terms of rear-
ranging corporate parents and subsidiaries, continuing creation of new
partnerships, limited liability partnerships, and limited liability corpora-
tions, a broad application of the sham theory would seem inappropriate.
Where corporate structures are changed for a variety of reasons, such as
from the sale of operations that are no longer seen as being part of a
specific entity's "core business," to tax reasons, etc., applying this theory
too liberally could lessen the long-time protection that the corporate veil
has provided shareholders. The holding suggests that individuals or busi-
ness firms may not be blatant about stripping the assets of a business
entity when claims have been asserted for environmental liabilities.
255. Id. at 119.
256. Id. at 120.
257. Id. at 120.
258. Id. at 120.
259. See id. at 121.
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